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Introduction  
Support for employers and unions engaged in collective bargaining may be provided by 
private or independent facilitators as well as by state dispute resolution agencies. This 
paper examines the role of private facilitators in assisting employers and unions to reach 
agreement, often in the context of significant change and restructuring programmes. 
Little is known about the modus operandi of private facilitators working to assist the 
parties to collective bargaining, whether in Ireland or internationally. The extent to which 
private facilitators operate to support collective bargaining, the roles they undertake and 
any trends in their involvement and activities are subjects about which very little is 
known.  The focus of this paper is on the work of private facilitators in assisting the 
parties to collective bargaining to reach agreement in circumstances where no current 
dispute exists and the parties are either seeking to renew existing agreements or to reach 
new agreements. As private facilitators in Ireland also play a role in facilitating 
agreement in disputes at the behest of the Labour Court, their work in this area is also 
examined. 
Private Facilitation: International Overview 
Internationally the prevalence and nature of private facilitation appears to vary from 
country to country. The focus here will be on Anglo-American countries that share a 
tradition of third-party involvement in conflict resolution beyond the ambit of civil 
courts. In the US and Canada a variety of facilitation roles developed from the 1990s 
during the vogue in workplace partnership. These involved the provision of support in 
such areas as quality of work–life initiatives, new forms of work organization, the 
establishment and facilitation of partnership committees and changes in dispute 
resolution processes and systems (Chaykowski et al. 2001: Ch. 2). Within collective 
bargaining itself new roles also emerged for third parties – working privately for state 
dispute resolution agencies – who might now be required to undertake more complex 
mediation roles that could include addressing deeper underlying issues surrounding the 
relations between the parties to collective bargaining (Chaykowski et al. 2001: Ch. 4). 
That said, private arbitrators, who have long played a key role in US industrial relations, 
remain wedded in the main to rights-based adjudicative roles and appear reluctant to 
adopt more flexible, interest-based roles (Chaykowski et al. 2001: 15; Cohen 2010: 14).  
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In the US education sector, new facilitation and co-facilitation roles (involving pairs of 
employer and union mandated third parties) also arose in the context of exercises in 
interest-based bargaining animated by education reforms. Not all approaches to interest-
based bargaining however favoured the use of facilitators (Klingel 2003: 33).1 
In Australia, public policy under Liberal/National Party governments from the mid-1990s 
to 2006 favoured the privatization of conflict resolution by creating financial incentives 
for engaging private mediators in collective bargaining and by restricting access to the 
state conflict resolution system. These changes were subsequently reversed by the 
Rudd/Gillard governments (see Van Gramberg et al. 2014). Data collected in a 2013 
survey of 230 HR managers in Victoria by researchers at Monash and Swinburne 
Universities found that private dispute resolution specialists had assisted in resolving 
collective disputes in 16 per cent of instances – compared to 35 per cent of instances 
where Fair Work Australia (now the Australian Fair Work Commission) had played a 
role. Six per cent identified private facilitators as the most effective of the alternative 
options available for resolving collective disputes, compared to 21 per cent for Fair Work 
Australia.2 It has been observed that private facilitators active in Australia are highly 
experienced and of high calibre.3  One of the few studies examining the role of private 
facilitators in interest-based bargaining involves an Australian aluminium manufacturing 
plant.  Macneil & Bray (2013: 719) conclude that the role of the facilitator in interest-
based bargaining is a ‘highly sophisticated project’, involving the facilitator working 
mainly as a ‘process consultant’ but also providing expert information on the processes 
and techniques used as well as working with the parties involved to diagnose relationship 
problems. In addition, drawing on Walton & McKersie’s work on integrative bargaining, 
they suggest that facilitators need to address five objectives to support the bargaining 
process: building motivation, developing information and an ‘appropriate bargaining 
language’, improving the knowledge or increasing the skills of the bargaining parties, 
defining bargaining roles and building trust (Macneil & Bray 2013: 704–6). The picture 
that again emerges is one in which the facilitator is proactive but non-directive. The 
process is also seen to involve distinctive principles, phases and problem-solving 
techniques. 
The picture in New Zealand is one in which different modes of facilitation and mediation 
are nearly monopolized by state dispute resolution agencies. As in Australia public policy 
and legislative initiatives during the 1990s had called into question the role of public 
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dispute resolution bodies, especially in the handling of collective conflict (see Rasmussen 
& Greenwood 2014). In practice private mediation and facilitation have been confined in 
the main to complex disputes in strategic and rapidly changing sectors. An example is 
provided by the use of private mediation in a dispute in the Ports of Auckland (see 
Rasmussen & Greenwood 2014: 464-5).4 
In the UK, Acas dominates the provision of facilitation and related modes of third-party 
involvement in collective bargaining (see Saundry & Dix 2014). As in the case of New 
Zealand, significant exceptions do arise. One example is the role of private facilitation in 
brokering the three-year agreement, ‘Business Transformation and Beyond’ negotiated in 
2009–2010 between the Royal Mail and the Communication Workers’ Union.5 
Various forms of private facilitation have long been evident in industrial relations in 
Ireland. In the past however private facilitation appeared to have been very limited in 
incidence and also ad hoc in nature. The numbers of private facilitators providing 
assisted bargaining and a variety of other services to organizations and their unions have 
expanded over a decade or more. The field has also become more organized through the 
creation of specialist consulting firms and divisions in firms offering more general HR 
consultancy services.  A survey conducted towards the end of the Irish boom estimated 
that about 20 per cent of firms employing 20 or more people and accounting for about 27 
per cent of employees had availed of ‘external experts to assist in reaching settlement or 
to prevent deadlock in discussion or negotiation’ (Hann et al. 2009: Ch. 4). The wording 
of the survey item means that the estimate could include cases where assisted bargaining 
services were provided by the LRC. 
In summary, private facilitation has played a limited role in conflict resolution in Anglo-
American countries. The limited incidence of private facilitation sometimes masks the 
significance and high profile of the cases in which private facilitators have become 
involved. It has also been observed that private facilitators could include practitioners of 
great experience and high professional standing. In the US, private facilitation roles of 
various kinds developed around the vogue in workplace partnership and related concepts 
from the 1990s and private facilitators sometimes play pivotal roles in sectors such as 
education undergoing significant reforms.  
 
4 
 
The Conduct of Private Facilitation in Ireland 
The analysis of the work of private facilitators presented here is based on interviews with 
six people who have very significant experience in this field. The analysis is supported 
by the comments and observations of facilitators on their work. Case studies are included 
to illustrate the activities of private facilitators and to identify the kinds of circumstances 
in which private facilitation occurs. The following themes focused the conduct of the 
interviews: 
 The circumstances in which organizations and unions seek assistance from private 
facilitators. 
 The processes involved in assisting the parties to collective bargaining. 
 The challenges involved in facilitating the parties to reach agreement. 
 The objectives of the parties in seeking assistance and the outcomes attained. 
 Views on trends in the involvement of private facilitators in assisting the parties to 
collective bargaining. 
Private bargaining facilitators come from a variety of professional backgrounds. They 
have worked as trade union officials, in employers’ associations, as HR managers, in 
state dispute resolution agencies and not uncommonly in several such capacities over the 
course of their careers. Many offer a range of services to clients, which include mediation 
or investigation in disputes involving individual employees and investigation and 
adjudication in collective disputes. Their professional networks, often extending back to 
previous industrial relations roles, are important in providing sources of business.  
The private facilitators interviewed for this study were chosen to reflect the full spectrum 
of the professional backgrounds of people active in the area. As will be discussed below, 
the professional backgrounds of private facilitators influence the ways in which they 
assist bargainers. Sometimes private facilitators deploy a range of models of facilitation 
and a wider variety of facilitation methodologies.  
Private facilitation may be initiated by employers or by unions but takes place on the 
joint agreement and invitation of the parties. It is also sometimes initiated or mandated by 
the Labour Court. Occasionally private facilitation is initiated by IBEC, ICTU and 
government – working in unison to resolve major disputes. In the experience of those 
interviewed, a range of circumstances can lead to the involvement of private facilitators 
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in collective bargaining. Employers may feel that they are operating ‘outside their 
comfort zone’, especially when dealing with other than traditional bread and butter HR 
and IR issues like pay claims or redundancies. An important influence has been 
employers’ attempts to address complex, multi-stranded and often technical problems or 
change programmes that required, in the words of one facilitator, a ‘lot of teasing out’ of 
issues. Another remarked that ‘it’s no longer acceptable to launch these programmes [by 
having] a quick chat with your IBEC person and away we go. That doesn’t work 
anymore.’ Important in influencing the use of private facilitation in public service 
organizations have been impending mergers or reorganization or reviews of public 
services where crises had arisen that had significant HR and industrial relations 
dimensions. In other instances in both the private and public domains, single issues, such 
as impending changes to working time, or transfers of undertakings, triggered private 
facilitation. In some of these circumstances pressure on the parties to find agreement 
within tight time frames meant that referral to the public dispute resolution agencies was 
not a viable option. In other circumstances private facilitation was used to ‘forestall 
threats on the horizon’. Employers have also availed of private facilitation, as have 
unions engaged in joint working or partnership initiatives. Facilitation was seen by 
private practitioners to fit well with the ethos underpinning partnership initiatives. 
Often the parties engaging private facilitators do not wish to resort to the public dispute 
resolution agencies. Employers commonly pay for facilitation and so need to have the 
financial resources to engage a private facilitator. Where private facilitators are engaged, 
an employer might not have ‘worked out its own agenda’ or the parties might be ‘stuck 
and there’s a reluctance almost to let a third party make a recommendation on something 
[with respect to which the parties] really haven’t worked out what they want to do 
anyway’. There may also be a reluctance to engage in a process that could result in a 
dispute being adjudicated by a dispute resolution agency through the application of 
prevailing norms in a sector or at national level.   
Some of the varying circumstances in which private facilitators are engaged to assist 
employers and unions are illustrated in the cases outlined in Box 13.1. 
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Box 13.1 Private Facilitation in Different Bargaining Conditions 
Outsourcing Bin Collection in Dublin City Council
Under the Croke Park Agreement Dublin City Council outsourced its commercial and domestic 
waste collection service in 2012. Talks between the Council and unions on the redeployment of 
waste workers focused on terms and conditions of employment. The Labour Court recommended 
that there should be re-engagement, within a short time frame, around the practical implications 
of the decision to outsource. A facilitator reported to the Court on matters that had been 
concluded, including a framework for reassignment, and on the final positions of the Council and 
unions on other matters. The facilitator reported that progress in resolving a number of issues 
would require further third-party involvement by the Labour Relations Commission and possibly 
by the Labour Court. Some people in the frame for reassignment had resorted to a separate 
binding appeals process in the Council. 
 
Restructuring and Job Losses at Ulster Bank 
In 2011 Ulster Bank and the IBOA jointly agreed a mediator to assist in negotiations covering 
issues ranging from pay, working hours, pensions and contractual issues to pending employment 
law cases. Proposals were issued in a ‘basket of measures’ that included pay, an early retirement 
scheme, voluntary redundancy arrangements and severance terms. The recommendations were 
described by the mediator as ‘representing a most significant step in contributing to the further 
development of the relationship between the parties. The recommendations were accepted by the 
employer and in a ballot of IBOA members. The IBOA described the proposals as ‘balanced’ and 
as having resulted from ‘positive engagement … involving compromise by both parties’. 
 
In January 2012 Ulster Bank announced a major restructuring programme that contained 
proposals for up to 950 job losses. Following the failure of direct negotiations with IBOA and 
SIPTU and IBOA’s rejection of the company’s severance offer, the mediator was re-engaged to 
assist the parties reach agreement. A series of recommendations put forward covered early 
retirement and voluntary severance. An appeals process was outlined and there was provision for 
the further involvement of the mediator concerning matters of interpretation, but only after 
manifest attempts by the parties to resolve these directly. The proposals were accepted by the 
Bank and by the IBOA. The mediator was subsequently involved in clarifying aspects of the 
proposals. 
 
Productivity Measures and Operating Costs at Boliden Tara Mines 
In 2010 Boliden Tara Mines proposed a new set of productivity measures for the remainder of the 
life-span of mining operations in Europe’s largest zinc mine near Navan. The mine employs 700 
people. Mining at the site is due to expire in 2018. A two-year agreement, to be subject to 
renewal at agreed time points, was reached with SIPTU in 2012. The agreement covered ore 
handling, the use of contractors, pay and the handling of disputes. The agreement also contained 
proposals for flexible working, the relaxation of demarcation and training. The new disputes 
procedure included direct local engagement followed by the involvement of an agreed facilitator. 
The inclusion of provision for a facilitator formalized a practice that had been in use at the mine 
for a number of years, during which both joint and sole facilitators had assisted the company and 
unions.  
 
A similar set of proposals to those agreed with SIPTU was presented to the company’s craft 
unions, Unite and TEEU. Following failure to reach agreement, the dispute was referred to the 
Labour Court. The Court recommended that a facilitator should also be engaged in assisting the 
parties to the dispute.  
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The facilitation process ran up against a deterioration in the mine’s financial position within the 
mining group. In November 2012 the company announced that it needed to seek significant cost 
reductions in its budget for 2013. Reductions were sought in production and payroll costs. 
Reductions in staffing were to be achieved through early retirements. Doubts emerged about the 
future of the mine. In accordance with the disputes procedure that had been agreed with SIPTU, 
the agreed facilitator assisted the parties in local negotiations. When the parties failed to reach 
agreement, their differences were referred to the LRC for conciliation. Subsequent to conciliation 
the unresolved dispute was referred to the Labour Court. The employer indicated that there would 
be a temporary shutdown of operations at the Navan plant in the event of an agreement not being 
reached on proposed new pay rates. The Court sought an independent financial assessment to 
inform its investigation, which now involved all unions at the mine. 
 
The Labour Court recommended that an alternative cost-saving agreement proposed by the 
unions merited consideration and should be subject to joint discussions with assistance from a 
facilitator. In the event, the parties opted to engage directly with each other without facilitation. 
Some of the proposals that had been at play when the facilitation process had been suspended the 
previous year were nonetheless central to talks between the firm and the unions.  
 
The parties reached agreement on a set of cost-reduction proposals that amended the original 
agreement reached with SIPTU and the company agreed to a significant level of investment in the 
mine. Agreement was also reached on the establishment of a joint industrial relations forum in 
which company management and unions would consult on operational issues in the running of 
the mine. 
Staffing Levels at Monaghan General Hospital 
Following the completion of a major programme to reconfigure hospital services in the HSE 
Dublin North East Region in 2009, a dispute arose over staffing levels for non-nursing grades in 
Monaghan General Hospital. The dispute was not resolved through the local procedure and was 
referred to conciliation at the LRC and onwards for investigation by the Labour Court. The Court 
was reluctant to adjudicate on matters that in its opinion were best resolved through direct talks 
between the parties, and nominated a facilitator to work with the parties to find a solution. 
 
 
Source: Industrial Relations News; HSE records and interviews. 
 
 
As outlined above, private facilitators are sometimes engaged at the behest of the Labour 
Court. In such circumstances disputes between parties will have proceeded through 
conventional disputes procedures and will have been subject to LRC conciliation before 
private facilitators become involved. The Court will have been reluctant to furnish a 
recommendation on the grounds that the matters at issue needed further exploration and 
possibly resolution through direct talks, facilitated by a third party. Not infrequently in 
instances of private facilitation mandated by the Labour Court, co-facilitation involving a 
pair of third parties, one with a trade union and the other with an employer background, 
is the mandated form. In instances where private facilitation is mandated by the Labour 
Court, the Court will have formed the view that direct local engagement between the 
parties had been limited – one or both parties having failed seriously to negotiate around 
the issues in contention. As a result a dispute will have been prematurely progressed 
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through the stages in a dispute resolution procedure, culminating in a request for 
investigation by the Labour Court. By mandating private facilitation in these 
circumstances, the Court in effect is seeking to counter ‘narcotic’ and ‘chilling’ effects 
whereby an over-reliance on standard dispute resolution procedures by one or more 
parties had resulted in a failure to narrow down or resolve issues in contention through 
negotiation. At the same time the Court is reluctant to issue a recommendation on issues 
that appear to it as better dealt with by the parties involved. Where the Court nominates 
facilitators, they are mandated where possible to bring about a resolution to the dispute, 
or to report back on their deliberations and on the views they have formed. These in turn 
are likely to influence any subsequent recommendation issued by the Court. Assisted 
bargaining in these circumstances obviously occurs in the shadow of Labour Court 
adjudication. In instances of post-Labour Court involvement by the LRC, problems 
arising from recommendations in effect trigger renewed efforts at conciliation. Where the 
Labour Court itself mandates facilitation, a more general process can ensue which 
combines facilitation, conciliation and ‘fact finding’ or investigation.  
Examples of Labour Court-mandated facilitation are provided by disputes over staffing 
levels for non-nursing grades at Monaghan General Hospital that arose from earlier LRC 
facilitation and conciliation initiatives in the HSE Dublin North East health services 
reconfiguration programme and over the outsourcing of refuse collection in Dublin City 
Council (Box 13.1) and by a dispute over pay at Liebherr Container Cranes (Box 13.2.)  
Box 13.2 Facilitation Mandated by the Labour Court in Liebherr Container Cranes 
 
Liebherr Container Cranes is a German family-owned multinational that has operated in 
Killarney, Co. Kerry, since 1958. The firm employs 670 people and is the largest manufacturing 
employer in Kerry. Liebherr is recognized as a good employer but has a recent history of difficult 
industrial relations. SIPTU represents close on half the workforce and about 60 electricians are 
represented by the TEEU. Demand for the plant’s product is buoyant and the business is 
profitable. Liebherr has claimed that the business has been facing increased global competition in 
a sector where production is mobile in nature. 
 
Liebherr’s unions lodged a claim for a 2.5 per cent pay increase, payable from January 2009, 
under the national agreement entered into by unions and employers in 2008. The so-called 
‘Towards 2016 Transitional Agreement’ was repudiated by the employers’ association, IBEC, 
which represents Liebherr, when the economic crisis struck in the final quarter of 2008. Liebherr 
contended that it was not in a position to concede a cost-increasing claim and that such a 
concession would detrimentally affect employment and the firm’s financial position, and render 
uncertain the firm’s future viability. The firm offered to pay an increase in three phases, 
commencing in 2012, with the final phase to be paid in 2014 in return for a number of cost-
offsetting and normal ongoing change concessions. 
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The dispute was referred to conciliation at the LRC and onwards to the Labour Court, which 
investigated the dispute in May 2012. The Labour Court issued a recommendation which 
enjoined the parties to engage in meaningful negotiations on matters of concern to the firm and 
the unions. The Court recommended that these discussions should be facilitated by the LRC and 
should be completed by the end of July 2012, with any outstanding matters referred back to the 
Court. The LRC initiative failed to resolve the dispute – the unions insisting that the firm concede 
the pay rise without conditions. 
 
Subsequent to a further Labour Court hearing in February 2013, the Court nominated two 
facilitators, one with an employer and the other a union background, to assist the parties in 
resolving the dispute. Facilitation led to a suspension of unofficial industrial action that had been 
instituted at the plant and was conducted mainly through separate meetings with the firm and the 
unions. The facilitators attempted to establish a framework for resolving all the issues in 
contention. The facilitation process was unable to resolve the dispute. The parties differed over 
concessions sought by the firm in return for the pay rise claimed by the union and the period over 
which payment might be made retrospective. The facilitators submitted a report to the Labour 
Court. In November 2012 a one-day official work stoppage occurred at the plant.  
 
A further Labour Court hearing was conducted in December 2013. The Court formed the view 
that while the facilitation process was in being there was potential to resolve some of the issues 
that remained in contention between the parties, while others might require significant changes to 
conditions of employment. The Labour Court recommended that the firm should pay the 2.5 per 
cent pay rise with effect from January 2014, retrospective to the May 2012 Court hearing. 
Payment was to be subject to the parties reaching agreement on areas that remained in contention 
between them. For the dispute to be resolved, ‘immediate and robust’ engagement between the 
parties would be required. The Court recommended that the two facilitators who had assisted the 
parties in 2013 should again play a role in seeking a resolution to the dispute. The Court 
anticipated that the facilitation process might identify issues that required separate negotiations in 
a further facilitated process.  
 
The firm accepted the Labour Court recommendation but expressed disappointment with the 
industrial action and the outcome of the dispute. It announced that it would reconsider aspects of 
its Irish operations, giving rise to a protest from the union that threats to relocate were not in 
accordance with good industrial relations practice. The parties disagreed on the significance of 
some transfer of production from Kerry to other Liebherr plants.  
 
Fears for the plant’s future deepened when, in January 2014, union members rejected the Labour 
Court recommendation by a wide margin in a ballot. The parties engaged in further local-level 
discussions and then attended talks at the LRC, chaired by the Director of Conciliation. These led 
to an agreement brokered de novo by the LRC and represented to the parties as definitive of what 
could be achieved through negotiation. A rejection of the agreement was seen as carrying ‘severe 
implications’ for the plant. The parties to the dispute accepted the agreement. 
  
Following the original Labour Court hearing in May 2012, the TEEU opted to pursue its claim 
independently through local talks rather than engage in the facilitation process. Following the 
resolution of the dispute with SIPTU, the TEEU claim for a pay rise led to an agreement 
facilitated by the LRC. 
 
Sources: Industrial Relations News and various media reports. 
 
These cases also reveal the complex sequence in which LRC conciliation, Labour Court 
investigation and private facilitation sometimes occur, as well as linkages between these 
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dispute resolution processes. Some instances were referred to where private facilitation 
might have been used cosmetically: one of the parties simply seeking to buy time and to 
show ‘progress’ in their handling of an issue.   
An examination of facilitation as practised by private facilitators reveals significant 
differences of approach or philosophy among facilitators, reflecting their different 
professional backgrounds and preferences – although all stressed that it was imperative to 
work flexibly and to adapt approaches both to the circumstances and the wishes of the 
parties. Some facilitators with a background in organizational psychology and 
organizational development sought to work, wherever possible, through ‘joint problem-
solving’ or ‘group process’ methodologies or even on the basis of a formal interest-based 
bargaining model. Sometimes people with a background in industrial relations had also 
been attracted by methodologies, regarding them as one set of tools in the tool-kit of 
facilitation. Where approaches were adopted, the principles guiding facilitation were 
derived from templates in the professional literature: ‘[I work] to help them jointly to 
solve their problems – to construct a solution together.’ ‘[I am] focused very much on the 
process of helping people talk and engage and argue and debate and gather information.’  
More often, facilitators with backgrounds in industrial relations tended to eschew 
templates or formal models of these kinds. All facilitators deployed a core set of 
facilitation and conflict resolution skills and competencies.  The basic process involved a 
combination of plenary and separate meetings with the parties, with the greater focus on 
working through plenary or joint sessions than would be typical of conventional 
conciliation.  
To some extent you have to work separately, but I will always try to 
maximize the joint and minimize the separate to get to a stage where an 
outcome is in sight.  
Formal and informal engagement – the latter focused mainly around sounding out 
principals and seeking clarification – were integral to the process. Facilitators typically 
began their work by agreeing ground rules, clarifying agendas and timescales and 
outlining the modus they intended to follow in working with the parties. Facilitators 
commonly drafted documents that charted progress and pointed towards settlement 
proposals or agreements. Facilitators differed with respect to how directive they were 
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willing to become to move the process forward. Some described their style as ‘fairly 
forceful’ or even ‘confrontational’ around matters of detail that separated the parties. 
The facilitation process was also understood as typically involving highly intensive 
engagement. Facilitators spoke of conducting regular half-day sessions, involving one or 
a couple of meetings each week within a short time-frame.  
I’m doing something at the moment and I know that I’m going to be asked to 
give a couple of weeks to it … morning, noon and night, and I have to be able 
to commit to that. 
Facilitators differ with respect to the manner in which they seek to frame the issues in 
contention between the parties. For some, differences and disagreements around specific 
issues are viewed as symptomatic of deeper underlying dynamics in relationships and 
cultures and addressing these is seen as integral to facilitation. Thus some facilitators will 
seek to: ‘broaden the agenda to generate multiple options to solve a problem, or to 
identify that a problem is bigger than the one issue which has been identified’.  
Facilitators will also sometimes be critical of the ‘lack of self-understanding’ of one or 
other of the parties and of their inability to comprehend the wider culture underlying their 
dealings. In such circumstances facilitators may see it as an important part of their role to 
reflect this back to the parties in search of a transformative understanding that might 
become the prelude to addressing specific and concrete issues: ‘I would be saying 
straight up … you need a transformative process, you need to move beyond this.’  
Other facilitators stress that they seek, as a matter of principle, to avoid addressing 
anything other than the problems with which they are presented by the parties, insisting 
that facilitators are better advised to ‘avoid strategizing the thing’. Their proper role, they 
contend, using a sporting analogy, is to ‘play what is in front of you’. 
I know HR and IR executives who stay awake at night thinking around 
corners. You deal with what you’ve got. And if [this] leads to another 
problem, you deal with that problem.  
Another area where facilitators differ surrounds whether they are willing, or even 
sometimes determined, to act as conciliators or adjudicators as part of the facilitative 
process, either in the event that agreement cannot be reached, or where difficult and 
12 
 
contentious issues hold up the search for agreement. The critical influences here were the 
professional backgrounds and experience of facilitators and the provenance of 
facilitation. Some facilitators, particularly those with an organizational development 
background, are not willing, as a matter of principle, to conciliate or adjudicate. This 
reflects both their preferred facilitation style or philosophy and their lack of experience of 
conciliation or adjudication. Some people with a background in conducting group 
facilitation processes were disinclined to conciliate or adjudicate: ‘I wouldn’t want to go 
there because I don’t think that’s what I have to offer; that’s not my skill set.’ Others 
expressed a willingness to act in these capacities if the parties wished them to do so, or if 
this had been a pre-agreed facet of facilitation: ‘you need to be flexible in these roles. 
The ultimate job is to get the result that’s best for everyone.’  
People who had experience of having conciliated or mediated in individual or collective 
disputes expressed a greater readiness to include these processes in their facilitation 
efforts. This carried the proviso that the parties involved approved of their involvement in 
these capacities. Where proposals were presented by facilitators, or they engaged in 
adjudication, the parties involved would have indicated in advance that they were willing 
to agree to those proposals, or accept the terms of an adjudication decision. Other 
facilitators actively sought a mandate to conciliate or adjudicate at the outset of the 
facilitation process. They said that, if it was not formally agreed at the outset that they 
could conciliate or adjudicate, they routinely sought a mandate for these activities as 
matters unfolded.    
If I get a say in my role, if they agree terms of reference, I have always sought 
to have an adjudication role at the end. … If not at the start, I will try to get it 
in the process. … It gives me a whole different weight. 
The ‘weight’ that might be gained by facilitators arose from the leverage that facilitation 
and adjudication could give them when they were in a position to signal to parties that a 
particular posture would not be likely to hold up under adjudication. They also indicated 
that the principals on both sides might be able to use such signals to secure agreement 
within their own constituencies.  
They observed that, in conciliation, pressure points or sources of leverage could be found 
in the prospect that a dispute might lead to a work stoppage or in the spectre of the 
‘Labour Court hanging around in the background’. In the absence of these pressure 
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points, some facilitators said that they tried to identify alternatives. Among these were 
deadlines after which changes would be initiated. Facilitators also sometimes spoke of 
the weight that could be gained from a professional reputation, or from having been 
tasked with conducting an independent investigation, or by being part of an ‘expert 
panel’. 
The provenance of facilitation could also shape the role.  Facilitators nominated by the 
Labour Court were commonly mandated to report on proposals for settlement. These 
were often developed through plenary and side conferences in which the positions of the 
parties were explored and tested. As such, it becomes clear that facilitation mandated by 
the Labour Court could involve conciliation, ‘fact finding’ or investigation and what 
amounted to adjudication – if not by facilitators themselves then by the Court to which 
they reported back. 
Box 13.3 summarizes the main features of private facilitation in assisted bargaining. 
These sometimes overlap facilitation in assisted bargaining as practised by the LRC. 
They also reveal some significant points of difference, in particular surrounding the 
apparent lesser extent to which conciliation skills and postures represented the default 
skill set underpinning facilitation and also surrounding the more diverse methodologies 
that private facilitators claim to use.  
 
Box 13.3 Features of Assisted Bargaining with Private Facilitation 
 Generally no current dispute exists between the parties involved.  
 In some instances facilitation is mandated by the Labour Court as an alternative to issuing a 
recommendation and as a means of promoting active negotiations between the parties to a 
dispute – countering ‘narcotic’ and ‘chilling’ effects.  
 Generic facilitation and conflict resolution skills are deployed by facilitators to gain 
agreement on ground rules, shape agendas and promote movement. A combination of 
plenary or joint and separate meetings is favoured. Facilitators differ with respect to how 
directive they may be on issues causing deadlock and barriers to progress.  
 All facilitators stress the need for flexibility, but some favour, or can offer, joint problem-
solving or interest-based bargaining approaches and methodologies.  
 Some facilitators refrain from offering to conciliate or adjudicate, or do so only in very 
isolated circumstances. Others are at ease with these processes, if agreed to by the parties, 
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and some seek a mandate at the outset or during the process for conciliation and 
adjudication.  
 Deeper engagement possible than with conventional collective bargaining, facilitation or 
conciliation. 
 Facilitation process can encompass conciliation and possibly adjudication/arbitration. 
 
Among the challenges that arise in facilitation, according to private facilitators, was their 
inability to focus the parties on resolving issues and reaching agreement by highlighting 
the likely outcomes if disputes issues were referred to the Labour Court. However 
sometimes, as discussed, the process of reporting back to the Court provided this 
leverage to Court-mandated facilitators. 
Other facilitators pointed to quite different challenges. These included low levels of trust 
between the parties themselves. Added to this was the challenge of generating trust in the 
independence of the facilitator, particularly where, as was common, the employer paid 
for their services. Low levels of trust between the parties or a legacy of mistrust was not 
seen as insurmountable when this was brought out openly on the table and addressed. For 
employers and unions to agree to facilitation in the first place, there must have existed 
some degree of trust, though it was recognized that this might have existed to a greater 
degree among the principals on both sides than among line managers or shop stewards.  
Trust in the bona fides of the facilitator posed a different challenge. Private facilitators 
stressed the importance of establishing their neutrality and impartiality and of not being 
‘in the pocket’ of either party. This challenge remained where facilitators were engaged 
because they came from employer or union backgrounds.  
Other challenges identified included dealing with personal frictions between or among 
the parties to facilitation or working with ‘difficult personalities’. Facilitators sought to 
handle such challenges by allowing for the expression of personal views and by 
otherwise managing conflict at the table. Weak negotiators that conceded too much to the 
other side without reciprocation were sometimes a problem, as they would soon lose 
credibility with their own side. In such circumstances, the facilitator, or even 
interlocutors on the other side of the table, sometimes worked to shore up the weaker 
position to avoid the facilitation process collapsing.  
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Seen as more common were challenges that arose from differences within the sides 
involved in conciliation. Inter-union and intra-union differences were reported sometimes 
to complicate or even prevent settlement, especially where dissenting voices on either 
side stood outside the facilitation process and urged those taking part to persist with a 
more conventional adversarial posture. In some instances, such as that of Boliden Tara 
Mines outlined in Box 13.1, separate facilitators worked with bargaining units covering 
craft and general workers.   
Different unions could also adopt contrasting postures towards facilitation. Some major 
unions were seen to have developed a proactive and strategic appreciation of facilitation, 
whereas others held a ‘different view of the world’.  Ideological opposition to facilitation 
informed by fundamental values could preclude settlements within facilitation, 
irrespective of the terms on offer. Internal conflicts could also arise between employers, 
especially in the case of multinational firms, where local subsidiaries might sometimes be 
unable to win the support of parent companies for settlement terms. Sometimes 
compounding the inherent difficulty of gaining agreement when complex change 
programmes were at issue were what one facilitator described as: ‘international people, 
people flying in from abroad that just don’t get it as to how we do business here’.  
Regarding the objectives of the parties to facilitation and the outcomes of facilitation the 
predominant view was that employers and unions most commonly entered facilitation to 
gain a deal or agreement. The most common matters at issue were ‘brass tacks’, ‘the 
basics:  pay, pensions, sick pay’. Other outcomes, such as a deeper understanding of their 
own positions, or of the other side’s difficulties and constraints, or improved relations, 
were seen as valuable by-products of a process whose objectives and outcomes were 
mainly pragmatic and concrete. Improved relations and a better awareness of alternatives 
to adversarial or positional bargaining, or to conventional dispute resolution procedures, 
were seen as not uncommon outcomes: ‘Because they’re spending more time with each 
other … they’re finding out more about there not being hidden agendas.’  
Private facilitators presented different views on trends in the use of facilitation. These 
differences to some degree reflected differences in professional backgrounds and the 
patterns in the sectors and areas where their work was concentrated. Also in the 
comments of some, long-term trends in the economy and collective bargaining were most 
salient. In the case of others, the effects of the business cycle seemed uppermost when 
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they reflected on trends. So contrasting projections may be as much a reflection of the 
timescales in respect of which reflections were being offered as of differences in 
underlying interpretations. 
In the view of some private facilitators, the volume of facilitation had grown and was 
expected to continue growing, either indefinitely or unless economic circumstances 
changed radically. Growth in the use of facilitation was seen as a reflection of the 
unprecedented supply of experienced and highly reputable facilitators in the market. For 
others this growth reflected challenges facing employers and unions, especially around 
change agendas and particularly in the public service. Others pointed to the new 
attraction of facilitation for strategically or ideologically well-disposed unions. Even 
unions that had gained members in the recession were seen to have lost power and to 
have looked to facilitation as a means of anticipating problems and heading them off in 
circumstances where change agendas could otherwise be imposed by employers who 
were now firmly in the ‘driving seat’. From this perspective facilitation might be 
expected to increase in incidence until unions regained power, or pressure from 
employers eased. The use of private facilitation was sometimes also seen as a reflection 
of a growing tendency on the part of employers to enlist external expertise to resolve 
problems within organizations. In the same way that organizations occasionally used 
solicitors or auditors, they were turning to private facilitators to resolve employment 
problems within the boundaries of the organization as an alternative to relying on 
external agencies. Not all of those reflecting on long-term trends thought that facilitation 
would grow in incidence. Some pointed to declining union density and the shrinking 
coverage of collective bargaining as developments that would likely depress the use of 
private facilitation.  
Facilitators more focused on the effects of the business cycle, and specifically of the 
recession, interpreted trends in a different light. For them the recession had significantly 
depressed the use of facilitation because organizations had less money to spend on the 
process; bargaining agendas had more commonly revolved around basic ‘bread and 
butter’ issues; and employers had become more capable of achieving change without 
obstruction, more willing to refer disputes to the LRC, or – in the case of the public 
service – more determined to press matters to compulsory arbitration. In this view the 
incidence of private facilitation had declined and would continue to be depressed.  
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Conclusions 
Like the facilitators of assisted bargaining in the LRC, private facilitators reverse the 
long-standing axiom that third parties can best assist in the search for agreement after the 
parties directly involved became deadlocked and registered a failure to agree. In some 
instances however the Labour Court appoints private facilitators or co-facilitators to work 
with parties in dispute to re-activate failed or stalled direct talks and promote agreement. 
This process of engagement again leads the parties to disputes back towards direct 
engagement in a manner not envisaged in conventional dispute resolution practice. 
Private facilitators handle a range of issues, from complex change and restructuring 
programmes to changes in conflict management procedures. They also commonly offer 
clients a range of facilitation methodologies. Some offer joint problem-solving 
approaches or work on the basis of principles and techniques rooted in interest-based 
bargaining. Others seem to prefer methods closer to conciliation, although all see a 
distinction between their work as facilitators and many of the skills and techniques 
associated with classical conciliation. Private facilitators sometimes engaged in what 
amounted to informal conciliation conferences, particularly when operating under 
mandate from the Labour Court. Fact-finding, clarifying the issues at stake between the 
parties and the merits of their respective positions, also appear to be a common 
component of facilitation and co-facilitation when mandated by the Labour Court.  
Private facilitators differ with respect to whether they are prepared to engage in 
adjudication. Some facilitators refuse to act in an adjudicative capacity; most however 
are prepared to do so at the request of the parties; and some seek a mandate to adjudicate 
as part of the agreed rules guiding the facilitation process. 
Complex and blurred relationships are evident between the processes of facilitation, 
conciliation and adjudication. This complexity extends to the sequences in which these 
processes may progress, as evidenced by the cases outlined earlier.    
The private facilitators interviewed were unanimous that the primary objective of 
employers and unions in entering facilitation was to reach agreement on concrete issues. 
Relational outcomes like ongoing improvements in industrial relations were seen as 
unintended consequences of a process with more immediate objectives. 
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As in the case of facilitation provided by the LRC, the primary outcome of private 
facilitation, where successful, involved deeper engagement between employers and 
unions than occurred under conventional collective bargaining supported by traditional 
dispute resolution procedures and processes.  
As represented by private facilitators, the process of facilitation is versatile in the range 
of mediation approaches offered by many practitioners, allied to their willingness to 
occupy multiple mediation roles that can include facilitation, conciliation and even 
adjudication.  
Private facilitation was triggered by a series of influences. Complex change and 
restructuring programmes were commonly identified as important influences. Most 
private facilitators expected the incidence of private facilitation to grow over the medium 
to long term. While there may have been a cyclically induced dip in the incidence of 
assisted bargaining, in the opinion of most, longer-run changes in business conditions, in 
the practice of management, in the postures of major unions and in the availability of 
skilled facilitators were set to increase the prevalence of assisted bargaining.  
It is possible to identify about 20 high-profile private facilitators who regularly – if not 
continuously – engage in facilitation. Beyond this core group of highly reputable and 
experienced facilitators, many others claim either expertise or experience in various 
modes of workplace dispute resolution. The view of most private facilitators – a view 
shared by some colleagues working in state dispute resolution agencies – was that private 
facilitation was set to grow in Ireland. 
How can the emergence of a critical mass of private facilitators be explained? Certainly 
the growth of private facilitation cannot be attributed to any adverse perceptions of the 
effectiveness of the LRC as the State’s main dispute resolution agency. The LRC 
continues to enjoy high standing among employers and unions and indeed among private 
facilitators themselves. Like state dispute resolution agencies in other countries, the 
LRC’s services remain free at the point of use, and public policy has never sought to 
incentivize resort to private facilitation or conciliation. 
A key distinctive driver of the development of private facilitation in the Irish case might 
be the institutional framework for conflict resolution in Ireland as this has developed over 
a period of more than two decades. The role assigned to the LRC in national and sectoral 
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agreements may well have acted as a significant catalyst for employers and unions to 
experiment with private modes of facilitation. Under the regime of social partnership that 
existed for more than 20 years up to 2009, the LRC was the designated agency for 
resolving disputes on matters covered by national agreements and in discharging that role 
acted as a gatekeeper to investigation by the Labour Court. This may well have fostered 
the perception on the part of some employers and unions that the activity of the LRC had 
inevitably become constrained by the terms of national agreements and that conciliation 
was a conveyor belt to the Labour Court, where adjudication would certainly take 
account of the terms of prevailing national agreements.  
Such a perception might have been strengthened as a consequence of the role of the 
Labour Court in ‘policing’ national agreements which were extended through the 
emergence of what amounted to binding determination or mandatory arbitration by the 
Labour Court during the second half of the social partnership era.  
There were many references in interviews with private facilitators, as indeed also in 
interviews with LRC officers, that one of the key reasons why parties sought ‘extra-
procedural’ facilitation was their reluctance to set in motion the procedural steps 
involving conciliation by the LRC and investigation by the Labour Court. With the 
collapse of social partnership in 2009 and the advent of the Croke Park/Haddington Road 
agreements in the public service, the LRC continued in broad terms to play a similar role 
to that played under the social partnership agreements. The Labour Court continued to 
arbitrate on disputes under Croke Park/Haddington Road. In the private sector, the LRC 
and Labour Court have continued to be the designated pivotal agencies for dispute 
resolution under the ‘protocol’ agreed between IBEC and the Irish Congress of Trade 
Unions following the collapse of social partnership. So in part the private facilitation 
sector in Ireland may have grown as an unintended consequence of the designated role of 
the LRC and Labour Court in national agreements and in successor public and private 
sector agreements.  
Another institutional influence on the incidence and prominence of private facilitation in 
Ireland has been the practice of the Labour Court to appoint facilitators or co-facilitators 
in some disputes where the Court is reluctant to adjudicate and forms the view that 
matters in contention are best addressed in facilitated direct talks between the parties 
involved. While this process only impacts on a small number of disputes, operates under 
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the shadow of adjudication and lacks the flexibility that arises where there is voluntary 
joint resort to facilitation, it has contributed to institutionalizing private facilitation within 
the Irish dispute resolution system. The predominant practice of the Court however is to 
refer disputes to the LRC for further deliberation. More generally, the recent vogue in the 
use of ADR to resolve disputes in such areas as commercial and family affairs has added 
further to the impetus that led to the growth of the private facilitation sector – even 
though public policy and legal reforms in employment dispute resolution have been more 
tentative in deference to the pivotal roles in these fields of the LRC and the Labour 
Court.  
Another influence on private facilitation is the supply of experienced and highly 
reputable practitioners available to provide this service. As the demand for private 
facilitation has grown, the supply of private facilitators has also grown in response and 
the market for private facilitation has become more organized. Both general HR 
consultancies and specialist conflict resolution firms have begun to market their services 
actively to prospective clients. In turn, the salience of private facilitation has increased 
and more people have become aware of the potential to pursue careers in this field. This 
in turn has fed the growth of professional training programmes and of professional 
mediation bodies.   
These various influences, interacting in a self-reinforcing spiral, have contributed to the 
growth and institutionalization of private facilitation in a manner that has not been 
planned or designed by any of the parties to the dispute resolution process.  
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Notes 
 
1 Thanks to Prof. Alex Colvin, ILR School, Cornell for his advice on private facilitation 
in the US.  
 
2 Thanks to Prof. Julian Teicher, Prof. Greg Bamber and Dr Brian Cooper of Monash 
University and to Prof. Bernadine Van Gramberg, Swinburne University of Technology, 
Melbourne for providing these early data from their survey. 
 
3 Prof. Bernadine Van Gramberg, Swinburn University of Technology, Melbourne and 
Prof. Julian Teicher, Monash University, Melbourne and Dr Johanna Macneil, Newcastle 
University, New South Wales, provided helpful advice on private facilitation in 
Australia.  
 
4 Thanks to Prof. Erling Rasmussen, Auckland University of Technology and to Susan 
Scott, Chief Mediator, Resolution Services, Market Services, Ministry of Business, 
Innovation & Employment, Auckland and to Prof. Ian McAndrew, University of Otago, 
for advice on private facilitation in New Zealand. 
   
5 Thanks to Prof. Richard Saundry, Plymouth University, Prof. Paul Latreille, University 
of Sheffield and Virginia Branney, Employment Relations Consultant & Mediator, for 
advice on private facilitation in the UK. 
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